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Pollution Control and the Ramsey Problem 
FREDERICK VAN DER PLOEG 




Department of Mathemattcs and Compuung Scwnce, Umversity of Technology, P.O. Box 513, 
5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands. 
Abstract. Pollution is an inevitable by-product of production and is only gradually dissolved 
by the environment. It can be reduced by producing less and by cleaning up the environment, 
but neither occur when they are left to the market. Cleaning activities and the optimal 
emission charges increase with the stock of pollutants. When one allows for pollution of the 
environment an the classical Ramsey problem, the capital stock is less than in the market 
outcome and afortiori less than under the golden rule. The analysis distinguishes between 
stock and flow externahues arising from pollution. An increase in impatience can lead to more 
capital accumulation, even though this leaves less room for current consumption. 
Key words. Pollution control, abatement activities, capital accumulation, Ramsey model. 
1. Introduction 
Pollution is an inevitable by-product  of production, which damages the 
environment and is only gradually dissolved. Since there are no private 
markets for pollution rights, market  outcomes are inefficient and give rise to 
too much production and pollution (e.g., Dasgupta, 1982). The four standard 
approaches to environmental policy are property rights, binding quota 
restrictions, Pigouvian taxes and subsidies, and markets for pollution permits. 
The problem with property rights is that they are difficult to define, since 
many pollution and environmental problems are characterised by the prob-  
lem of the common.  The problem with quotas is that emission standards are 
difficult to enforce and lead to high administrative costs, whilst the difficulty 
with emission charges and permits is that they only apply in well-behaved 
situations without non-convexities. The present paper  focuses, nevertheless, 
on optimal emission charges in the context of a dynamic pollution problem 
embedded in the Ramsey model. Since pollution is essentially a problem of 
missing markets,  the emission charges correspond to the social price of an 
additional unit of pollution. 
Section 2 considers pollution control when waste is a by-product  of 
production. Distinction is made between the social costs of both the flow and 
the stock of pollutants. The market  outcome and the socially optimal 
outcome are compared.  Because in the absence of government intervention 
there will be too much pollution and not enough abatement  activities, 
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Pigouvian tax and subsidy schemes can be used to sustain the socially 
optimal outcome in a decentralised market economy. Section 3 reviews the 
Ramsey problem of optimal consumption and capital accumulation and 
thereby sets the scene for later sections. Section 4 discusses how environ- 
mental stock and flow externalities can be added to the Ramsey framework 
and discusses previous work in this area. Sections 5 and 6 focus on Pigouvian 
tax and subsidy schemes and show how they can be used to correct for 
environmental flow and stock externalities in the Ramsey problem. Section 7 
discusses the socially optimal level of abatement activities within the context 
of a Ramsey model with social costs associated with a stock of waste 
products. It is then possible that more impatience leads to more capital 
accumulation, despite the fact that this leaves less room for current private 
consumption. Section 8 analyses why the market invests too little in clean 
technology and Section 9 briefly considers the implications for environ- 
mental policy when renewable resources are used as factors of production. 
Section 10 concludes the paper. 
2. Pollution Control 
It is assumed for the time being, that there is no investment in physical 
capital; later sections relax this assumption. Consumption, C, is thus produc- 
tion of goods, Y, minus the amount of output that is used to clean up the 
environment, A. Production is limited by the availability of given factors of 
production, so Y ~< Ymax' Net social benefits of consumption are given by 
B ( C ) ,  B '  > 0, and marginal benefits are decreasing in the level of consump- 
tion, B" < 0. One reason may be that as a society consumes more, it needs 
to produce more and thus needs to work harder and forego more leisure in 
order to secure an additional unit of consumption. To rule out non-positive 
levels of consumption, it is assumed that B'(0) = co. Pollution is an 
inevitable by-product of production, a Y, where a > 0 denotes the emission- 
output ratio. The emission-output ratio can be improved by investment in 
new technology, but this will be ignored for the time being (see Section 8). 
The stock of pollutants, S, follows from 
= a Y -  ~ ( A ) S ,  S(O) = So, given, (2.1) 
where a(A) >/ 0 denotes the rate at which pollutants are dissolved by the 
environment. There is an amount A of total production Y devoted to 
cleaning-up activities. The rate at which pollutants are dissolved is higher 
when more efforts are made to clean up the environment, o' > 0. Returns to 
such efforts are diminishing, c~" < 0. Pollutants such as DDT dissolve very 
slowly, whilst herbicides dissolve quite quickly. 
The social welfare function is given by 
W --- exp( -0 t ) [B(Y--A)  -- D F ( a Y  ) -- Ds(S)] dt, (2.2) 
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where 0 > 0 denotes the social rate of discount, DF(aY ) (with D )  > 0 for 
a Y # 0 and D F(0 ) = 0) denotes the social damage caused by the flow of 
pollution (e.g. due to noise) and Ds(S ) with (D s > 0 for S # 0 and 
DIs(0) = 0) denotes the social damage caused by the stock of pollutants (e.g. 
due to the stock of SOz in air). Pollutants often display threshold effects; for 
example, below a certain level of smog trees survive, but above this level 
trees do not survive. This leads to non-convexities and means that it is 
difficult to rely on Pigouvian taxes and subsidies in the design of environ- 
mental policy. Here it is assumed that the marginal damage increases with the 
stock of pollutants, so that the damage functions are convex, D}, D s >/ 0. 
The following conditions must be satisfied for optimal social welfare: 
B ' ( Y - A )  = a[(D'F(aY ) + r] ---- ~r'(A)Sv (2.3) 
Ds(S ) - o ( A ) r  +/ -  = 0r  (2.4) 
where r denotes the optimal emission charge per unit of pollution, ct Y. The 
second equality of (2.3) holds only if A > 0; if Ds(.) = 0 then it is optimal to 
have A = r = 0 and the second equality of (2.3) is replaced by a greater 
than inequality. The shadow price (co-state) associated with the stock of 
pollutants corresponds to -3 ,  because the concentration level of pollutants is 
a stock with a negative social value. Equation (2.3) demands that the 
marginal social benefits of consumption should equal the marginal flow plus 
stock damage to the environment due to consumption. 
In the absence of any stock damage, D s - O, emission charges are zero, 
= 0, so that the marginal social benefits must equal marginal social flow 
damage, B' (C)  = aD'F(aY) giving rise to C = C s. The market outcome, 
however, corresponds to a maximum level of production and consumption, 
C M = yM = Yrnax' Since the market does not internalise the externality to 
consumers associated with pollution arising from production, the levels of 
production and consumption are too high (see Figure 1). The socially 
optimal outcome can be sustained by levying a consumption tax at a rate 
equal to aDF(aC s) and redistributing the revenues in a lump-sum fashion. 
Alternatively, it can be sustained by levying a pollution tax equal to D'F(aC s) 
per unit of emitted pollutants. 
Now consider stock externalities and, for the time being, assume that the 
rate at which pollutants are dissolved is constant (A = constant). In that case 
equation (2.3) can be solved to give 
Y = Y(A, r) (2.5) 
where YA = B"/(B" -- a2D;.) > 0 and Y~ = a/ (B"  -- aZD~) < 0. Hence, 
the optimal level of production and thus of pollution increases when efforts 
are made to clean up the environment and when the social cost of the stock 
of pollutants decreases, for example as a consequence of less concern with 
stock damage. 
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Fig. 1. Market and social outcomes in the presence of flow externalities only. 
Alternatively, when efforts to clean up the environment are endogenous, 
equation (2.3) can be solved to give 
A = A ( r , S ) ,  Y =  Y ( v , S )  (2.6) 
where A~ = (B"'F~ - ~7'S /[~r"Sr + _ ) _ B"(1 --_ YA)], A s = - c r ' r / [ o " S r  + 
B"(1 -- YA)] > 0, Y~ = Y A A ,  + Y~ and Ys = YAAs  > 0. When the stock of 
pollutants increases, the efforts to clean up the environment increase and 
ceteris paribus one can afford to have a higher level of production. The 
effects of a decrease in the social cost of the stock of pollutants on the level 
of production and efforts to clean up the environment are ambiguous: the 
direct effect is for the level of production to increase, the marginal benefit of 
consumption to fall and thus the level of cleaning-up activities to increase, 
but the indirect effect is to reduce the social need for cleaning-up activities so 
that these efforts are reduced. Which way it goes is part of the old-age 
dispute in environmental discussions! The optimists say production must go 
up in order to be able to afford to clean up the environment, whilst the 
pessimists argue that production must go down, even if this leaves less scope 
for cleaning-up activities, as pollution as a by-product of production domi- 
nates all else. This dispute can only be settled by empirical evidence. If there 
are no flow externalities (D r =- 0) present, then a = o 'S ,  YA = 1, Y~ = Y~ = 
a / B "  < 0, A,  ---- 0 and A s = - -o ' /cr"S .  A n  increase in the social cost of 
pollutants does not affect cleaning-up activities, A~ = 0, because the 
emission-output ratio ( a )  equals the marginal increase in depreciation arising 
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from cleaning-up activities. Production Y does decrease, Y~ < 0, giving 
support to the camp of pessimists. 
Equation (2.4) says that in equilibrium the social rate of return on the 
stock of pollutants, i.e., the marginal social damage minus the rate of 
depreciation plus the expected capital losses, should equal the social rate of 
discount. This, of course, resembles the arbitrage equation familiar from, for 
example, Hotelling's theory of exhaustible resource depletion. 
The dynamics of the stock of pollutants and the optimal emission charge 
are given by: 
= a Y ( r ,  S ) -  ~r(A(r, S))S, S(O) = S O (2.7) 
"? = [0 + o (A(v ,  S))]v - D's(S ). (2.8) 
The phase diagram for the case that cleaning-up activities and thus deprecia- 
tion are exogenous is presented in Figure 2. The S = 0-locus slopes down- 
wards, because a higher stock of pollutants must be caused by a higher level 
of production induced by a lower level of the optimal emission charge. The 
= 0-locus slopes upwards, because an increase in the stock of pollutants 
increases the marginal damage caused to the environment and thus requires a 
higher emission charge. The equilibrium is at the intersection of these two 
loci, 1 whilst the transient behaviour is described by saddlepoint dynamics. A 
fall in the emission-output ratio shifts the S = 0-locus down and thus moves 
the equilibrium from E to E'. On impact the optimal emission charge and 
level of production drop immediately (move from E to A) and subsequently 
.5' = 0 l 
§  §  ~ -  
$ 
S 
Fig. 2. Emission charges and stock of pollutants in the presence of stock externalities 
(o'(A) =- a). 
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they are further reduced until the stock of pollutants has fallen to its new 
equilibrium value (move from A to E'  along the new saddlepath S 'S ' ) .  On 
the other hand, an increase in the social rate of discount (or the government's 
pure rate of time preference) shifts the i -- 0-locus down and thus moves the 
equilibrium from E to E". As a result of this increase in impatience, the 
stock of pollutants increases and the optimal emission charge falls. A 
subsequent exogenous increase in efforts to clean up the environment shifts 
the equilibrium from E" to E ' .  The impact effect corresponds to a move 
from E"  to B, whilst the transient effect corresponds to a move from B to 
E ' .  
An important issue is what are the appropriate Pigouvian taxes to sustain 
socially optimal behaviour as a decentralised market outcome. Since there 
are two externalities (flow and stock), it is sensible to have two taxes: one on 
gross emissions (~c) as they affect the flow and one on net emissions (rN) as 
they affect the stock of pollutants. In a decentralised market economy firms 
maximise (taking I-c, z u and S as given) B ( Y  - A )  - v c a Y  - TN[aY -- 
o (A )S] ,  which gives the social optimum provided r c = D ) ( a Y )  and ZN = 3. 
Alternatively, gross emissions are taxed at the rate T c + ~'N, and cleaning the 
environment is subsidised at the rate z N. Provided the activity of cleaning up 
the environment (A) can be decentralised, only two Pigouvian taxes are 
needed to sustain the first-best outcome. Any excess revenues should be 
redistributed in a lump-sum fashion to the private sector. 
3. The Ramsey Problem 
The following sections discuss Ramsey problems with pollution. In order to 
have a benchmark, this section first gives a bird eye's view of the Ramsey 
problem. A more detailed treatment may be found in Blanchard and Fischer 
(1989). 
Ramsey's model is the classic framework for studying the optimal inter- 
temporal allocation of resources. Preferences of the infinitely-lived represen- 
tative family (or dynasty) are equal to 
W -- e x p [ - O t ] B ( C ( t ) )  d t  (3.1) 
) 
where 0 is a constant 2 and C(t )  denotes per-capita private consumption at 
time t. Production is characterised by constant returns to scale. Per-capita 
output, Y, is given by the intensive-form production function, f ( K ) ,  f" > O, 
f "  < O, f(O) = O, f '(O) = oo, f ' (oo)  = 0 where K denotes the per-capita 
capital stock. Since output is either consumed or invested, one has 
Is = f ( K )  -- C -- ( 6  + n ) K ,  K(O)  = Ko, (3.2) 
where n denotes the exogenous growth rate of labour supply and d denotes 
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the rate of physical depreciation of the capital stock. Alternatively, income is 
either saved (in the only asset that is available in this economy) or consumed. 
Because there are no externalities whatsoever, the fundamental theorem of 
welfare economics says that the market outcome is socially optimal and thus 
corresponds to the command optimum. The social planner maximises (3.1) 
subject to (3.2). This yields the famous Keynes--Ramsey rule 
d = [ f ' (K) - -  O -  n - -  6lq(C)C,  (3.3) 
where r/ -- - B ' / ( C B " )  > 0 denotes the instantaneous elasticity of inter- 
temporal substitution, and the transversality condition 
lim [ K ( t ) B ' ( C ( t ) )  exp(--0t)] = 0. (3.4) 
t ~  oo 
Equation (3.3) is nothing more than the continuous-time efficiency statement 
that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption at two points of 
time should equal the marginal rate of transformation. In a market economy 
firms maximise profits and set the marginal product of capital to the user 
cost of capital, i.e., f ' ( K )  = r + d where r denotes the market rate of 
interest. Similarly, families maximise the discounted value of life-time con- 
sumption,.(3.1), subject to their intertemporal budget constraint, which yields 
the "'tilt" C = (r - n - O)t lC and consumption as the propensity to consume 
times the sum of human wealth plus non-human wealth. Hence, when the 
market rate of interest, r, exceeds the pure rate of time preference, 0 + n, 
society prefers to save and defer consumption and thus consumption 
increases over time. Conversely, if r < 0 + n, consumption falls over time. 
The higher the elasticity of substitution, ~/, the easier it is to substitute 
present consumption for future consumption and vice versa. For the case of a 
constant coefficient of relative risk aversion, /3, one has B ( C )  = C ~-~ / (1  - 
fi), fl > 0,/3 r 1, B ( C )  = log(C),/3 = 1, and then t/ - (1/fi) corresponds 
to the instantaneous elasticity of intertemporal substitution. 
A substantial literature exists on golden rules of economic growth (e.g. 
Phelps, 1966). The condition that maximises the long-run level of per-capita 
consumption is called the golden rule. This is f ' ( K )  = n + d and yields 
K ~; = qJ(n + d), qi' < 0. The condition that ensures a steady per-capita rate 
of consumption is called the modified golden rule. It is given by f ' ( K )  = 
n + d + 0 and yields K 'v(; = r  + ~ + O) < K 6, so that the capital stock 
is reduced below the golden rule level due to the impatience of society. The 
steady-state market real rate of interest, r(co) = n + O, is thus determined by 
tastes alone, whilst technology then determines the steady-state stock of 
capital, output and consumption. The phase diagram associated with equa- 
tions (3.2)--(3.3) is presented in Figure 3. 
The equilibrium E is the only steady state that satisfies the optimality 
conditions and that is also saddlepoint stable. 
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]( M G I (  G 
Fig. 3. The modified Golden Rule. 
/( 
4. Environment and the Ramsey Problem 
Here capital is incorporated into the model of Section 2 or, alternatively, 
environmental issues are incorporated into the model of Section 3. The social 
welfare function is given by 
W = exp(-  0t) [B(C) - De(af (K))  - Ds(S)] dt. (4.1) 
0 
The government maximises this welfare function subject to 
I s  K ( O ) =  K o given, (4.2) 
S = a f ( K ) -  o(A)S ,  S(O) = So given. (4.3) 
For simplicity, it has been assumed that there is no population growth (n = 
0). This is a control problem with two state variables. It is well known that 
such problems are hard to solve analytically. However, due to the special 
character of this particular problem, a good deal can be said about the 
solution. Before proceeding, it is worthwhile to compare the present 
approach with previous approaches which deal with capital accumulation and 
the environment simultaneously. The first reference is probably Keeler, 
Spence, and Zeckhauser (1971) who use a model where output depends 
through a neoclassical production function on the capital stock and is 
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allocated to either consumption, investment or reduction of the emission- 
output ratio. Only the stock of pollutants affects welfare in this classical 
study. The control variables are the proportions of output devoted to 
consumption and clean technology. A unique steady state is shown to exist 
with either no attempt to lower emission-output ratio (Modified Golden Age) 
or with a positive share of output devoted to cleaner technology (Murky 
Age). This study does not discuss abatement activities. Forster (1973) and 
Gruver (1976) also look at pollution and optimal capital accumulation, but 
they only consider the effects of the flow of pollution on welfare. An 
important text is Miller (1974); Chapter 3 is particularly relevant. The major 
differences with the present model are that Miller does not allow for 
abatement activities, that pollution is caused by consumption rather than by 
production and that total production over time is bounded by the limited 
availability of an exhaustible resource. Becker (1982) works along the lines 
of Brock's (1977) model of capital accumulation and environmental quality. 
He does not allow for abatement activities either. In his model there is joint 
production, so that output of goods is given by the production frontier Y -- 
F ( K ,  Z ) ,  F~, F z > 0, where Z denotes the waste generated by production. 
This allows for substitution possibilities between the capital stock and the 
emission of rubbish when one produces a given amount of output. As a 
consequence the development of the stock of waste products, S, is given by 
= Z - aS. Finally, Becker uses the maximin criterion for social welfare. 
He shows that an increase in the rate of time preference can lead to a higher 
steady-state capital stock and a lower level of pollution, even though this 
would leave less room for private consumption. This result sounds counter- 
intuitive, because normally one expects that less concern for future genera- 
tions leads to more pollution. The difference with a recent paper by Musu 
(1989) lies in the fact that in Musu's model capital can be used for produc- 
tion and abatement and can instantaneously be transferred from one activity 
to another. None of these authors take account of a direct effect of the flow 
of pollution on welfare. All of them establish the existence of a steady state 
which is shown to be locally asymptotically stable and of which the compara- 
tive statics are analysed. The work of Tahvonen (1990) should be mentioned 
here as well, be it that he pays almost exclusive attention to the harvesting of 
a renewable resource in connection with pollution control. Tahvonen and 
Kuuluvainen (1990) provide a very interesting analysis of a model with 
accumulation of capital and of waste products very similar to the present 
one. The main difference is that attention is focused on substitution 
possibilities between capital and the generation of waste products when 
producing a given amount of output, although the use of resources for 
abatement activities is ignored. 
In order to keep the analysis manageable, a distinction is made here 
between the case where there is only flow damage and the case where there 
is only stock damage arising from pollution. 
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5. Flow Externalities and the Ramsey Problem 
This section assumes that there is no detrimental effect of the stock of 
pollutants on welfare (Ds(S) =- 0). Then, obviously, there is no case for 
pollution abatement, so that A = 0. Since there are no social costs associated 
with the stock of pollutants, the problem of maximising (4.1) subject to 
equations (4.2)--(4.3) is relatively easy to solve. 
Individual households are too small to care about pollution as a by- 
product of production but the social planner does internalise such flow 
externalities. It is clear that the fundamental theorem of welfare economics 
no longer holds. The best line of attack seems to characterise the socially 
optimal outcome, contrast it with the market outcome discussed in Section 3, 
and show what kind of scheme of Pigouvian taxes and subsidies ensures that 
the market produces a socially optimal outcome. 
The transversality condition (3.4) is unaffected, but the Keynes--Ramsey 
rule is modified as follows: 
= { f ' (K) la  - a D F ( a f ( K ) ) / B ' ( C ) ] -  0 - 6} ~I(C)C. (5.1) 
Figure 4 shows how the modified golden rule is affected by flow externalities 
arising from pollution. The C --- 0-locus is given by 
aD'F(a f (K) ) f ' (K)  (5.2) 
B' (C)  = f ' ( K ) -  6 - 0 
and requires that the marginal social benefit of an additional unit of private 
consumption equals the marginal damage to the environment arising from the 
additional production required to satisfy consumption. The C = 0-locus can 
easily be shown to be downward-sloping and to go through the point C = 0, 
K = K Me. Hence, the phase diagram is as in Figure 4, rather than Figure 3. It 
is easy to see that the steady-state stock of capital is smaller than the one 
under the modified golden rule, because aD'r/B'  > 0 and thus from 
equation (5.2) r > 0. The steady state is.given by point E' .  
It is also instructive to consider the C = 0-locus in r - K space. It is given 
by 
r = R ( K )  = 6aD'r (a f (K))  + OB' ( f (K)  - 6K)  ] (5.3) 
B ' ( f ( K ) - -  6 K ) - -  a D r ( a f ( K ) )  I" 
This locus starts at R (0) = 0 and can easily be shown to be upward-sloping. 
The /~ = 0-locus in r -- K space is, of course, f ' ( K )  = r + 6, and is 
downward-sloping. Figure 5 illustrates how the intersection of these two loci 
gives the equilibrium levels of the interest rate and the capital stock, say, r P 
and K P. The presence of social costs arising from a flow of pollutants means 
that the steady-state capital stock is below and the steady-state real interest 
Pollution Control and the Ramsey Problem 225 
C 
\ f~' = (I / S" 
\C ' :0 '  \ Z / '  / 
///,+%\ 
/ ~i ': "---5 
~ ' = 0  
I(l" I( t' If ~ta K c  K 
Fig. 4. Flow externahties and the Ramsey problem. 
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Fig.5. Pollution and the modified golden rule. 
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rate is above the modified golden rule, given by point E. This gives rise to the 
"Polluted Golden Age", E'. The strict separation between tastes determining 
the real interest rate and technology then determining the capital stock and 
the level of consumption disappears, because technology and pollution 
externalities now interact to drive up the real interest rate. 
An increase in the emission-output ratio, a, steepens the C -- 0-locus in 
r - K space and increases the steady-state real interest rate and reduces the 
socially optimal steady-state capital stock (move from E'  to E"). Because 
less capital is being used for environmental reasons, less is produced and 
thus less is consumed. Figure 4 also shows that, even though the steady-state 
level of consumption must fall, on impact consumption jumps up (from E'  to 
A) before it declines (move along S"S" from A to E"). This misadjustment 
of consumption in response to an increase in pollution is the only way in 
which consumption can be cut in the long run. Similarly, when one manages 
to cut the emission-output ratio, consumption in the socially optimal out- 
come must first fall before it can increase in the long run (path E " A ' E ' ) .  
This reminds one of the French proverb: "reculer pour mieux sauter". 
The comparative statics with respect to the depreciation, d, and the pure 
rate of time preference, 0, can be performed in a similar fashion. An increase 
in either of these two parameters shifts the (27 = 0-locus in r - K space up 
and consequently the equilibrium real rate of interest increases whilst the 
equilibrium capital stock falls. Hence, the levels of production and consump- 
tion fall. 
The easiest way to sustain the socially optimal outcome in a decentralised 
market economy is to levy ,a Pigouvian tax on pollution a f ( K ) ,  at a rate 
equal to D'r(af (KS))  and to redistribute the revenues in a lump-sum fashion 
to firms. 
6. Stock Externalities and the Ramsey Problem 
If pollution is detrimental to the welfare of society as a stock, the social 
planner maximises 
W = f [  exp[-0t] [B(C(t))  - Ds(S(t))] dt  (6.1) 
subject to (4.2) and (4.3). The depreciation rate of the stock of pollutants is 
assumed to be constant, o(A) ~- a, so for the time being there are no 
resources used to clean up the environment. An interior solution must satisfy 
the modified Keynes--Ramsey rule 
---- {f ' (K)  [1 -- ( a / B ' ( C ) ) v ]  - 0 -- 6 } t/(C)C (6.2) 
and the arbitrage rule (of. (2.8)) 
f: = (0 + o )v  -- D s(S ). (6.3) 
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Clearly, the steady-state capital stock is again below the modified golden rule 
familiar from Ramsey's problem. For a given emission charge, v, the phase 
diagram associated with (4.2) and (6.2) is as was presented in Figure 4. The 
= 0-locus is again downward-sloping and intersects the /~ -- 0-locus 
below the modified golden rule. An increase in the emission charge, v, then 
shifts down the C = 0-locus and moves the equilibrium from E'  to E". The 
result is lower levels of steady-state consumption, output and capital. 
Similarly, the dynamics of S and r following from (4.3) and (6.3) can be 
analysed for a given capital stock in the manner discussed in Section 2. The 
four-dimensional phase dynamics is difficult to handle analytically. However, 
there should be two eigenvalues with negative real parts associated with the 
predetermined variables, K and S, and two eigenvalues with positive real 
parts associated with the non-predetermined variables, C and v, in order for 
the system to satisfy the saddlepoint property. This will be the case as long as 
the rate of time preference, 0, is not too high (see Appendix). 
If one assumes that the S - ~ dynamics adjust much more quickly than 
the C - K dynamics, which is the case when (a/a) is extremely large, one 
can solve under the assumption ? --- 0 and substitute the optimal (steady- 
state) emission charge 
v = Ds(af(K)/o)/(O + o) (6.4) 
directly into the modified Keynes--Ramsey rule: 
= {f '(K) [1 - (a/B'(C)) (Ds(af(K)/o)/(O + o)] - 
0 - 6 } *I(C)C. (6.5) 
The qualitative features of Figure 4 apply, because (6.5) and (5.1) give rise to 
qualitatively similar C = 0-loci. 
Since attention is restricted to the case where o(A) = o, a constant, 
standard methods yield the following comparative statics results for the full 
four-dimensional system (see Appendix). A higher emission-output ratio (a)  
gives again lower steady-state levels for the stock of capital, production, and 
consumption. The effects of an increase in the abatement coefficient o are 
opposite to the effects of a higher a, so it is optimal from society's 
perspective to have an increase in capital, production and consumption. 
Performing the comparative statics around the steady state with respect to 
0 and a yields 
(aT--  B')f" + Dsa U + r(O - r)B" dK 
o(0 + o) 
B'(200 + o o - r )  dO-- vf" + o(o + 0)] da. (6.6) 
The term associated with dK is positive. It follows that (OK/Oa) < 0 as long 
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as a is high enough. Hence, as long as the environment's rate of breaking 
down the stock of pollutants is high enough, an increase in the emission- 
output ratio depresses the optimal stock of capital and thus the rate of 
production. If 0 or a is sufficiently large, as seems extremely reasonable to 
assume, a higher rate of time preference induces a lower stock of capital and 
hence lower rates of consumption and pollution. 
7. Abatement Activities and the Ramsey Problem 
Consider the problem of Section 6 but now also take into account the 
optimal use of resources to clean up the environment, A. If an interior 
solution for C and A is assumed, one must have as necessary conditions 
equations (4.2) and (4.3) and equations 
B ' ( C )  = 2 
~a' (A  )S  = 
)~ -= ( a v  -- ~ ) f ' ( K )  + (0 + 6 )4  
and 





Here ~ is again the optimal emission charge and ). is the shadow price of the 
stock of capital. Due to the concavity-convexity assumptions there exists a 
unique steady state, characterised by/{7 = S = 0 and hence C = A = )~ = 
= 0. Furthermore, if 0 is small enough, the steady state is locally asymp- 
totically stable. This is not straightforward but it follows from the fact that 
the Jacobian matrix of the linearized system can be written as 
811 -~ OI HI2 ) 
J~'~ H21 82:2 '  
where all submatrices are 2 x 2, Hi1 = --Hzr2, Hzl ---- H ~ ,  HI2 ~ H~). Then 
it follows that if q: is a characteristic root of J, --~p + 2 is a characteristic 
root as well (see Appendix). So, for 0 small enough, there are two eigen- 
values with negative real parts and there exists a stable manifold containing 
the steady state. It can be shown that this manifold is non-degenerate. 
It makes therefore sense to study the steady state in some detail. First note 
that the steady-state stock of capital is again smaller than the modified 
golden rule stock of capital. This follows immediately from 2 = 0 and av  > 
0 in equation (7.3). 
Comparative statics calculations are rather tedious and do not lead to 
unambiguous outcomes (see Appendix). This is in line with earlier findings 
by Becker and Musu. As an example consider the effect of increasing the rate 
of time preference 0. In the Ramsey model one has f ' ( K )  ----- 0 + d so that 
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greater impatience leads to a smaller stock of capital. This effect is present in 
the extended model as well: the economic subjects want to consume as early 
as possible and therefore accumulate less capital. On the other hand, if it is 
not very costly to abate pollution, in other words, if the abatement tech- 
nology displays a high degree of efficiency (a '  is "large"), a low stock of 
capital leaves less room for cleaning activities because net output is small, 
whereas such activities may contribute considerably to welfare through the 
reduction of pollution. It is not clear a priori which effect dominates, so that 
a higher rate of time preference may lead to more capital accumulation. 
Becker (1982, p. 183) also finds that greater impatience may increase the 
steady state stock of capital but this only occurs in an unstable steady state 
and if the marginal productivity of capital is increasing in the generation of 
waste products. This phenomenon also occurred in the present model 
without abatement activities (see Section 6). In the Musu paper a higher 
stock of capital may be caused by the increase in the value of the marginal 
productivity. 
8. Investment in Clean Technology 3 
It has been assumed in the previous sections that environmental investment is 
directed only to activities to clean up the environment. Here the possibility of 
investing in clean technology is studied. It is assumed that the emission- 
output ratio can be reduced by investment in clean technology, I, that is a = 
a(I ) ,  a '  < 0. There are diminishing returns to such investment, so a"  /> 0. 
The social planner maximises the social welfare function 
W = e x p ( - 0 t )  [ B ( Y -  I )  - D F ( a ( I ) Y )  - Ds(S)] dt  (8.1) 
0 
subject to 
= a ( I ) Y - -  aS (8.2) 
Y ~< Yma~" (8.3) 
Assuming an interior solution for Y, I and C, the necessary conditions are 
B ' ( Y -  I )  = a ( I )  [D'~(R(I) Y)  + r I (8.4) 
B' (  Y -- I )  = - - a ' ( I )  Y[D 'F(a( I )  Y) + rl (8.5) 
f = (0  + o ) r  -- D~,(S) (8.6) 
S = a ( I ) Y - -  aS. (8.7) 
It follows from equations (8.4) and (8.5) that the level of production and 
the level of investment in clean technology are directly correlated, Y = 
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- a ( I ) / a ' ( I )  - Y(I).  If a(I )  has a constant elasticity, say ~, then Y(I)  = 
I/~7 and Y and I go up and down together. The locus for which ~ -- 0 is 
given by r -- D's/(O + a) and is upward-sloping in r - S space.The locus for 
which S -- 0 is given by S -- - a 2 / a a  ' = a(I)I/aT1 =- S(I), where S' is 
negative (positive) when ~ is less than (exceeds) utility. The level of invest- 
ment in clean technology, I, as a function of ~ follows from (8.4): 
B' - a ( I )  I )  
a ' ( I )  
= - D'F(--aZ(1)/a'(I)) - 3(1). (8.8) 
a(I)  
Together with S -- S(I),  equation (8.8) gives the S -- 0-locus in r - S space. 
The slope of the S = 0-locus in v - S space is ambiguous. Its sign equals the 
sign of 
B" - aZD"F -- B ' (a ' )3 / ( - -2a(a ' )  2 + aZa"). 
Since a" > 0 the third term need not be negative. It is likely, however, that 
the entire expression is negative. Then there exists a steady state which is 
stable and comparative statics is warranted. A higher rate of time preference 
0 causes a lower position of the ~ -- 0 curve and does not affect the S = 0 
locus. As a consequence the steady state level of pollution increases and its 
shadow price decreases, as would be expected. An interesting question is 
whether investments I increase as a consequence of a higher stock of 
pollutants or not. In the steady state a ( I ) Y  = aS. So a higher S calls for 
higher Y and/or lower/ .  But Y and I are related by - a ' ( I ) Y  = a(I) ,  saying 
that along an optimum the increase in pollution due to a marginal increase in 
production should be compensated by allocating additional resources to 
investment. In the steady state then investment in clean technology, /, 
increases as the stock of pollutants increases if and only if - 2 ( a ' )  2 -4- aa" 
> 0. So, for example, if the investments in clean technology have linear 
returns (a" -- 0) the S -- 0 locus slopes unambiguously downwards and a 
higher rate of time preference will decrease the willingness to invest in clean 
technology. However, suppose that a(I)  -- I - ' ( r /  > 0). Then a ( I ) Y  = 
I1-~/~ and in the steady state investment in clean technology increases with 
the concentration level of pollutants if and only if ~/ > 1. Hence, if there are 
large returns to investment in clean technology an increase in impatience can 
increase the willingness to invest in clean technology. 
There are many possible ways of extending the above models to allow for 
pollution and investment in clean technology. An obvious extension is to 
embed the analysis of this section in the Ramsey model. This would allow for 
investment in productive capacity, for production to depend on the capital 
stock, and for investment in a stock of clean technology, T, say a(T).  The 
resource constraint for the economy would then be given by 
/s = f ( K ) -  C -  T - -  6 ( K  + T). (8.9) 
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9. Renewable and Exhaustible Environmental Resources 
The models presented so far call for numerous extensions and generalisa- 
tions. It is not the objective of the present paper to give an exhaustive 
account of all possible directions that future research can take. It seems, 
however, important to stress the interrelationship between the environment 
and renewable and/or  exhaustible resources. This section provides an 
illustrative example of how this can be done. The stock of environmental 
resources, E, is depleted, because it is used up as a factor of production, R, 
(e.g., trees in the production of paper or other flora, fauna, coal, gas, etc.). 
This is detrimental to social welfare, both directly (less woods to enjoy) and 
indirectly as there are only limited resources, so eventually the current level 
of production and consumption may no longer be sustainable. The social 
planner maximises the social welfare function 




Ir = f ( K ,  R )  - C - a K ,  
S = a f ( K ,  R )  - aS 
(9.2) 
(9.3) 
= H(E, S) - R, (9.4) 
where U(E), U' > O, U" < 0 denotes the direct utility society derives from 
the stock of environmental resources. There are three dynamic equations: 
one for the physical capital stock, one for the stock of pollutants and one 
new one for the stock of environmental resources. The case of exhaustible 
resources corresponds to H(E, S) = 0. The general case of renewable 
resources allows for saturation in growth, HE > 0 for E < /7, H E < 0, for 
E > /7 and HEE < 0, and allows pollution to have an adverse effect on the 
natural replenishment rate, H s < 0. The properties of the special case of this 
problem which ignores the direct effects of the stock of environmental 
resources on social welfare is briefly discussed in Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen 
(1990). 
As a first shot, it seems sensible to focus on the environmental exter- 
nalities only, so it is assumed that H(E, S) = H ( E )  and D F = D s = 0. The 
modified Keynes--Ramsey rule becomes 
O = [fK(K, R ) -  0 - 6]~](C)C (9.5) 
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whilst the social value of the environment to society, say e, must satisfy 
= [0 - H ' (E)]e  - U ' (E)  (9.6) 
and the use of the environmental factor of production follows from 
B'(C) fR(K,  R) = e. (9.7) 
Equation (9.5) is familiar. Equation (9.6) says that the value of the stock of 
environmental resources to society is equal to the discounted value of future 
marginal utilities, where the social rate of discount is equal to the pure 
rate of time preference minus the natural replenishment rate of the stock of 
environmental resources. Equation (9.7) says that the marginal benefits of 
environmental resources in production should equal the marginal value of 
these resources to society. 
If the production function displays constant returns to scale in capital and 
resources, the marginal products of the intensive-form production function 
are homogeneous of degree zero. Upon solution of equation (9.7) for R and 
substitution of the result into equations (9.2), (9.4) and (9.5), one obtains: 
I~ = K f ( 1 ,  fk(E, C ) )  - C - aK (9.2 ') 
1~ = H ( E ) - -  Kfk(e, C), Oe < O, q}c < 0 (9.3') 
= [~p(e, C ) -  O -  6]~1(C)C, ~pe < 0, q;r < 0. (9.4') 
The comparative statics of this model are left for further research. 
10. Concluding Remarks 
This paper addressed the problem of simultaneously determining the socially 
optimal stock of physical capital and environmental quality and examined 
how Pigouvian taxes can be used to enforce these in a decentralised 
economy. Both flow and stock externalities in the control of pollution were 
considered. These externalities arise, because pollution is a by-product of 
production and is mostly gradually dissolved in the environment. Optimal 
investment in clean technology and optimal abatement activities were also 
considered. When matters are left to the market, cleaning up of the environ- 
ment does not take place and the levels of production and consumption will 
be too high from society's point of view. The government should step in and 
levy emission charges, clean up the environment and provide incentives to 
invest in clean technology. When one allows for pollution of the environment 
in the classical Ramscy problem, the capital stock is generally less than under 
the modified golden rule (which prevails under the market outcome) and a 
fortiori less than under the golden rule. As a consequence, the rate of 
consumption is also less. The problem the policy makers are facing is thus to 
reduce consumption and to direct investments to clean technology and abate- 
ment activities. This can be achieved by appropriate (dynamic) Pigouvian 
taxation. Of course, it is less appropriate in this long-run setting to rely on 
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the Coase Theorem, as intergenerational bargaining opportunities are hard to 
establish. 
For the models that have been used, it has been shown that there exists a 
steady state which is locally asymptotically stable and whose comparative 
statics properties have been analysed. The paper also reviewed and, when- 
ever possible, provided a synthesis of environmental problems in the 
extended neoclassical Ramsey framework of optimal capital accumulation 
and economic growth. There remain many open questions. For example, the 
relationship between the models studied here and those models concerned 
with renewable and exhaustible resources deserves more attention. Future 
research should tackle the difficult problems involved in analysing such 
integrated models. 
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Appendix 
(a) Local stability analysis for Sections 6 and 7. 
Define/~:= - r . / z  is the (negative) shadow price of the stock of'pollutants. 
Consider the system of equations (4.2), (4.3), (7.1)--(7.4). C can be solved 
from B'(C) = 2, to yield 
c =0, G=0. 
Then A is solved from - /uo'(A)S = it, giving 
A, = o'ito", Av = o'o'S/ito", A s = o' o'/u/ito". 
Next (4.2), (4.3), (7.3) and (7.4) are linearized in the steady state. Straight- 
forward calculations give the following Jacobian matrix. 
J =  
--f' + O + 6 --af' --(J. + a#)f" 0 I 
t*a'o'12a" (a + ~Sa'a'a'/2a") + 0 0 (f4uo'a'a'/).a") + D" 
--1/B" -- a'/2a" --Sa'o'/)La" f '  -- 6 -,ua'o'//to" / 
--So'o'/,~o" --SSo'o'a'I2o" ctf' --a -- ,uSo'~'o'/2o" / 
Or alternatively 
Hil + OI Hl~ ) 
J =  H2~ He~ 
where for all i and j H,j are 2 • 2 and Hll = -Hf2,  H21 = Hfl,  Hl2 = H(2. 
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Define 
o ( : ,  
Then it is easily verified that QjQ-1 = _ j r  + OI. Let ~0 be an eigenvalue of 
J and let x be the corresponding eigenvector. Then 
QJx = Qgax = gaQx = _ j r  Qx + OIQx. 
So -~0 + 0 is an eigenvalue as well. 
Co) Comparative statics analysis for Section 7 (0-' # 0). 
Upon  substitution of ~. and r from (7.1) and (7.2) into (7.3) and (7.4) the 
following system results for the steady state. 
((a/o.'S) - 1)f' + (0 + 6) = 0 
((0 + o.)B'/o.'S) - D' s = 0 
a f  - o .s  = o 
f - O K - C - - A = O  
where the arguments of the functions involved have been omitted. Straight- 
forward but tedious calculations lead to the following system 
{ , 
o.'~S-- (o"s) 3 dK + (o-,S) 2 + (o"S) 3 dS 
ao."f'fS f' } 
.Of_ [ )/o"S \3 + O"S d a  + dO + dO = 0 (A.1) 
[ (O + o.)B"O + ( o.'B' -B'O."S af '  } 
o.'S ~ + (0 + 0.) (o,S) 2 ~ dK 
-I- 
(0 + o.)B'o." ,, (0 + o.)B" ~ + 
(o 'S)  2 D s + O.'S O.'S 
o.'B' --B'O."S --0. } 
+ ~ + ( 0 + 0 . )  (o,S) 2 - ~  dS 
-t- 
- ( 0  + o.)g"f ( o.'g' 
(o.'s) 2 + ~ o.'~s- + (0 + 0.) 
(O+O.)B"K dO + B' dO=O.  
o'S o'S 
-B'O."S 
( o ' S )  2 
) }do 
(A.2) 
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Since f" < O, a / o ' S  - 1 < O, o" <<, O, D" > 0 and B" < 0 it is easily seen 
that all coefficients are positive except for the coefficients of dS, which are 
negative, and the one corresponding with dK in (A.2) of which the sign is 
not uniquely determined. Therefore not much can be said about the com- 
parative statics in the general case. 
(c) Comparative statics analysis for Section 6 (o' --- 0). 
For o' = 0 the following system is obtained 
( ~ar - B')f" 0 af' -D's 0 + a 
\a--f' a o o 
--~x 0 




dC ()(da) vf '  B '  B '  0 
_ 0 ~ 0 r dO 
0 0 - K  0 d6 ' 
f 0 0 - S  d o  
The results given in the text originate from this system, where it should be 
realized that D" > O, B" < O, f" < O, f'  > 6 + O, a r - B' < O. 
Notes 
t However, if the social damage function becomes, due to threshold effects, concave beyond a 
certain level of the stock of pollutants, two equilibria may exist, for example E and P. 
However, E is saddlepoint stable whilst P is globally unstable. 
e In a utilitarian framework with population growth 0 = ,o - n, where p is the rate of pure 
t~me preference and n is the rate of population growth. 
3 Previous work employed models with two-sectors, one production sector and one abate- 
ment sector (Siebert, 1987: Musu, 1989). 
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